FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A RESUME by CORWIN, EDWARD S.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS UNDER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT: A RESUMIE
EDw R S. CORWIN
Princeton University
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."'
The opponents of the Sedition Act of 1798 denied that the National
Government had the right to enact any law whatever limiting freedom
of the press. The critics of the Espionage Act 2 do not in theory
go so far-though actually they arrive at much the same result as did
their predecessors. In brief their view of the matter may be stated
thus: It was the purpose of the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion to relieve the press in the United States of the restraints imposed
by the common law doctrine of seditious libel, which condemned as
criminal all publications having a tendency to bring Church or State,
or the officers of the Government, or the administration of the law into
contempt. It follows, therefore, that the legal condemnation of a
writing because of the bad "intent" of the author or publisher thereof
would also be contrary to the First Amendment, since this intent is
ordinarily determined simply from the tendency of the writing. In
fact, it is urged, there can be, under the Constitution, no such thing
as seditious libel, however determined, but only the power to punish
incitements to crime, when there is imminent danger that the incite-
ment will prove successful; and if this doctrine is not embodied in
the First Amendment, at least it is implied in our theory of govern-
ment, which makes government the property of the people and not
vice versa.3
This part of the argument is not impressive. It may very well be
that just because the people feel the government to be theirs, they
also feel that they may concede it power to protect itself and other
social interests without too great danger to liberty. The question is,
who are the people? The real basis of the interpretation of the First
Amendment just given is the belief that the people are a moral unit,
that the social contract still holds among all men, that there are no
irreconcilables in our midst-and this belief may be questionable.
The main purpose of this article, however, is to examine the his-
torical foundations of this interpretation of the First Amendment.
' Federal Constitution, ist Amendment.
' For a detailed discussion of the Espionage Act and its amendments and of
the cases arising under it, see Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in
War Time: The Espionage Act (i919) 17 MIcH. L. REv. 621. See also Hart,
Power of Government over Speech and Press (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 410.
'This, in general, seems to be the position taken by Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,
in his article, Freedom of Speech in War Time (919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 932.
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This Amendment was written into the Constitution by students of
Blackstone, in the pages of whose Commentaries the notion of the
freedom of the press, from being a literary and political watchword,
is first raised to the position of an accepted legal concept. But Black-
stone's notion of freedom of the press, while it records the final result
of an important historical struggle, is a somewhat modest one. Briefly,
Blackstone defined freedom of the press as on the one hand freedom
from restraint previous to publication, and on the other hand, subjec-
tion to the law for abuse of this freedom. Of course, the law which
he has in mind is the common law of his day and includes, therefore,
the common law of seditious libel.a
It is urged against Blackstone's right to be regarded as an expositor
of the First Amendment, that he was a Tory and defended Parlia-
ment's right to tax the American Colonies, that he wrote before the
enactment of Fox's Libel Act, and that his view overlooks, therefore,
the grievance felt in England itself on account of certain trials for
sedition which took place there in the course of the eighteenth century.
4
These objections to a great extent answer one another. For if Black-
stone was a Tory, Fox at least was a Whig, who resisted vehemently
Parliament's right to tax America; and yet Fox felt it sufficient in
order to meet English public sentiment on the subject of seditious
libel, not to alter the substance of the common law, but merely the
procedure by which it had come to be enforced, which had been to
reserve the question of the tendency of the writing to the court, and
so to leave to the jury the right only of passing upon the fact of pub-
lication and what was called "the truth of the innuendoes," that is
to say, their meaning. The Libel Act of 1792, however, by authorizing
the jury to bring in a general verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty"
in prosecutions for seditious libel, as for other crimes, virtually trans-
ferred the question of tendency also to the jury. This act, it should
be noted, came after both the Fjrst Amendment and the Commentaries.
But the real question, of course, is not as to Blackstone's authority
in relation to the First Amendment, but that of the common law.
The First Amendment was preceded by provisions of a more sweeping
character on the same subject in several of the early state constitu-
tions. The "liberty of the press" is "inviolate," it is "not to be
restrained," it is "to "be inviolably preserved." Yet in exactly con-
temporaneous documents in neighboring states, the "responsibility"
of those who enjoy this liberty for its "abuse" is pronounced and the
occurrence of. trials for "libel both criminal and civil" is prevised.
It seems, indeed, very improbable that there was any idea in the minds
of those who framed these provisions that they were repealing the
ordinary standards of the common law; and as a matter of fact,
prosecutions for seditious libel occurred even in the I9 th century in
'aSee 4 Blackstone, Commentaries (Cooley's ed. 1871) 15I.
'See Chafee, op. cit. 938-939.
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States whose constitutions asserted "liberty of the press" in the
broadest terms.5  ," °rt' of the T'e
But perhaps it will be rejoined that the fate of the Sedition Act
at any rate proves that the First -Armnidment was regarded as having
swept away the common law of seditious libel.6 In the words of
Justice Holmes, in his dissent in the recent case of Abrams v. United
States,7 "I had conceived that the United States through many years
had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of July 14, 1798, by
repaying fines that it had imposed." To begin with, this argument
cannot refer to the first section of the Sedition Act, which penalized
conspiracy to oppose the measures of the government and "coun-
selling" or "advising" riot or insurrection. Even opponents of the
act-though inconsistently with their main argument-refrained from
demanding its repeal, and its provisions still remain in substance on
the statute book, nearly one hundred and twenty years after the demise
of the act.
The reference is, therefore, to the second section of the act, which
provided that if any person should write, print, or publish any "false,
scandalous, and malicious writing" against the Government of the
United States, or either House of Congress, or the President, "with
intent to defame" the same "or to bring them into contempt
or to stir up sedition within the United States," such persons should
be liable to -the penalties of the act. It is true, as Justice Holmes
points out, that the United States subsequently remitted fines paid
under this section; but why? On account of the definition which it
gave to "freedom of the press"? To some extent perhaps, but prin-
cipally because the act was deemed to represent an intrusion of the
National Government into a field entirely closed to it and so reserved
exclusively to the States. The other phase of the question was some-
times touched upon tentatively, but it involved too many pitfalls to
be entered upon with assurance. Thus Nicholas of Virginia, who
made the best argument delivered in Congress against the act, was
forced to defend an act passed by Virginia herself during the Revo-
lution, the opening section of which penalized "any word, open deed.
or act" defending the jurisdiction of the British King or Parliament
in Virginia. Asked how he reconciled such a measure with "liberty
of the press," he answered:
"This section passed at the beginning of the most awful contest
in which ever man was engaged . . . was to establish what? Not
See Respublica v. Dennie (18o5, Pa. N. P.) 4 Yeates, 267; see People v.
Croswcll (18o4, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 3 Johns. Cas. 337, discussed infra note 12.
'For a thorough and accurate discussion of the Sedition Act and the con-
temporary debate over it, see Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in
the Federalist Period (192o) 18 MICH. L. REV. 615.
'(1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17. For comment on this case see
COMMEXTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337; Wigmore (192o) 14 ILL. L.
REv. 539; Chafee (192o) 33 HARv. L. REv. 747; D. K., id., 44z; and a note
(920) 14 ILL. L. REv. 6or.
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the inviolability of the Governor of the State, nor the majority of
either House of the Legislature, but to punish men who should pro-
mote resistance to the right of the people to govern themselves, to
the principle of the Constitution, to the Republican principle.""
Here, however, is the whole doctrine of "tendency" which underlies
the common law of seditious libel, though the benefit of it is denied
to persons. And of like import is the letter in which Jefferson, while
the Sedition Act was still fresh in the minds of everybody, gave the
signal for the impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase on account of
the latter's "seditious attack" before-a grand jury at Baltimore "on
the principles of our Government."9
In the long run the protest against the Sedition Act accomplished
two results: It laid to rest the idea of a national common law of.
seditious libel of which the act was merely declaratory; while within
the States it rendered prosecution for political libels less and less fre-
quent until they ceased altogether, leaving officials dependent for their
protection on the ordinary law of slander and libel. On the other
hand, the opponents of the act were forced to make two important
concessions, at least inferentially: First, that the National Government
could regulate freedom of speech and of the press to the extent of
forbidding the counselling of disorder and breach of the law; and
secondly, that the State Constitutions had left the common law of
seditious libel operative so far as was necessary to protect the funda-
mental principles of government in the United States. For the rest,
the Sedition Act itself is notable as an effort to mitigate the rigors
of the common law which spread its influence to the States and so
became the starting point of a new formulation of "liberty of the
press."
The second section of the Sedition Act, quoted above, marked two
departures from the common law: The "scandalous and malicious"
publications which it banned must also be "false," and further they
must be uttered "with the intent" to bring about the results dis-
countenanced by the act. The third section of the act took a .farther
step and provided that defendants under it should be permitted "to
give in evidence, in their defense, the truth of. the matter" charged
to be libellous, and that the jury should have the right "to determine
the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other
cases,"-a development which had indeed been foreshadowed by a
decision of the Supreme Court in 1794.10 The test of intent which
was thus brought into the law of libel for the first time was a, reecho
on this side the water of some of Erskine's famous pleas; the test
of truth 'harks back, it may be surmised, to the famous Zenger Case,"
"Annals (5th Cong.) col. 3005 ff. See also ibid. -col. 2149 ff.
'See also Jefferson's letter to Mrs. Adams, September iN, 18o4, 4 Writings of
Thomas Jefferson (Washington ed.) $6o.
°Brailsford v. Georgia (1794, U. S.) 3 Dali. I.
(1735, N. Y.) 17 How. St. Tr. 675.
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which, though it had no value as a precedent, had left behind a
widespread though badly confused tradition as to its import.
The later importance of the Sedition Act becomes evident as we
turn for a moment to the case of State v. Croswell which came before
the New York Supreme Court in 1864.12 Croswell had been convicted
of having published "a scandalous, malicious, and seditious libel"
traducing Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, and
intending to bring him "into the great contempt" of the people of
the United States and of the State of New York. At the close of
the trial the Chief Justice had charged the jury that it was not part of
their province to decide on the intent of the -defendant "or whether
the publication in question was true or false or malicious," but only
"whether the defendant was the publisher of the piece charged in the
indictment" and "as to the truth of the innuendoes." On appeal
Alexander Hamilton, for Croswell, attacked this ruling on the ground
that the Sedition Act of 1798 had declared the common law for the
United States. He then laid down a definition of liberty of the press
which has been since repeated hundreds of times.
"The liberty of the press consists in the right to publish with impunity,
truth, with good motives, for justifiable ends, though reflecting on
government, magistracy, or individuals."
Hamilton's argument was accepted by Kent, who furthermore pointed
out the place that the defense of truth ought to have in the entire
defense, as follows:
"As a libel is a defamatory publication, made with a malicious intent,
the truth or falsehood of the charge may, in many cases, be a very
material and pertinent consideration. There can be no doubt that
it is competent for the defendant to rebut the presumption of malice
drawn from the fact of publication; and it is consonant to the general
theory of evidence and the dictates of justice, that the defendant
should be allowed to avail himself of every fact and circumstance
that may serve to repel that presumption. And what can be a more
important circumstance than the truth of the charge to determine the
goodness of the motive in making it?"
Hamilton's view, supplemented by Kent's, did not, it is true, pre-
vail with the court, which rejected the contention that the Sedition
Act established the common law for New York, and grounded their
decision on Lord Mansfield's exposition of the common law in the
Dean of St. Asaph'! Case.13 But Hamilton's triumph was not long
postponed. The same year a bill was introduced into the State legis-
lature which embodied his definition of freedom of the press, linked
up with .the provisions of Fox's Libel Act, and twelve months later
this bill was enacted into law by the unanimous vote of both houses.
A few years later the same formula was introduced into the New
York Constitution and to-day it finds place in nearly a third of our
state constitutions.
' (I784, K. B.) 4 Doug. 73."'Supra note 5, at P. 411.
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Our modem liberals, however, object to this most widely prevalent
definition of liberty of the press on the ground, as we have seen, that
to the extent that the intent of the writer is judged from the tendency
of his writing, the test of intent leaves the common law of seditious
libel in effect. It is therefore argued that in order to render con-
gressional legislation invoking the test of intent constitutional-since
the First Amendment cannot be deemed -to have presupposed the
common law of seditious libel as definitive of freedom of the press-
this test must be given redefinition. Such, at least, I take it, is the
purport of Justice Holmes's dissent in the recent Abrams case.',
The facts of this case, which already promises to become a notable
one, were as follows: Abrams and others had printed and distributed
circulars denouncing "the hypocrisy of the United States and her
allies" and summoning the "workers" to "a general strike."
"Workers in the ammunition factories you are producing bullets,
bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans, but also your
dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom.
Workers, up to fight."
On the strength of this and similar passages the defendants were
convicted under the Espionage Act, one of the counts being that they
had urged a curtailment of products essential to the prosecution of
the war, "with intent by such curtailment to cripple or injure the
United States in the prosecution of the war." From this verdict
they appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that there was no
substantial evidence in the record to support it.
In the portion of his dissent above referred to, Justice Holmes
admits that the defendants had urged a curtailment in the production
of things necessary for the prosecution of the war, but he denies that
there was evidence to show that this was done with the intent penalized
by the act.
"I am aware that the word 'intent' as vaguely used in ordinary legal
discussion means no more than the knowledge at the time of the act
that the consequences said to be intended will ensue. . . . But
when words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce
a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. .
It seems to me that this statute must be taken to use its words in a
strict and accurate sense. They would be absurd in any other. A
patriot might think that we were wasting money on aeroplanes .
and might advocate curtailment with success; yet, even if it turned
out that the curtailment hindered . . . the United States in the
prosecution of the war, no one could hold that conduct a crime."
The clear implication of Justice Holmes's language is that the legal
test of intent establishes a conclusive presumption, and that is not
so. I have not the charge in the Abrams case before me, but another
charge under the same act reads thus:
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"If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact
utter the words imputed to him in the indictment or words in substance
and effect like them, in determining what their purpose and intent
was in so doing, you will have a right to consider what would be the
natural, usual, and necessary consequences of uttering such words
at the time and place and in the presence and hearing of the people
referred to in the indictment."15
Then the charge proceeds a little further on as, follows:
"There is no presumption which is conclusive, either in law or in fact,
that he actually intended what may appear to you to be the natural,
usual, and necessary consequences of uttering such words, and you
will consider this matter in connection with al the other evidence in
the case for the purpose of determining what was in fact the
defendant's actual purpose and intent."'0
There would be, r suspect, little difficulty in clearing Justice
Holmes's advocate of curtailment in aeroplane production under such
a charge, especially if that person were discreet enough to refrain
from applying the term "murder" to the war which he was ostensibly
promoting. But even as to Abrams and his associates, it cannot be
admitted that the application of the legal doctrine of intent to their
case did injustice. As Justice Clarke points out in his opinion for the
Court, these men were entirely willing to cripple the prosecution of
the war with Germany if only by so doing they might also cripple
action against Russia. In law, as in ethics and in common sense, men
must be held to intend, if not the usual consequences of their acts,
certainly the necessary means to their objectives.
The issue raised by Justice Holmes is at basis the historical issue.
He is at one with those who urge that Congress must stop short, in
its regulation of speech and the press, with punishing words which
"directly incite to acts in violation of law" and which "bring the
speaker's [or writer's] unlawful intention reasonably near to success."' 7
His own words are:
"The United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces
or is intended to produce" (the sense in which the word "intended"
is used in this passage is left uncertain) "a clear and imminent danger
that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent."' 8
There is no doubt that the United States has this power-that was
'Italics mine.
'"Interpretation of War Statutes (1918) Bull. 19i. See also to the same
effect Bulls. 4, 49, 52, 79, 83, 112, II6, 123, 131, 133, r42, 143, 148, 149, I56, etc. Cf.
also Kent's language quoted supra.
1' Chafee, op. cit. note 3,at pp. 947-948.
' This seems to imply that the court may hold as a matter of law that the
probability of harm resulting from an utterance is so remote that a conviction
under the law for such utterance is unwarrantable. See also his words in
Frohwerk v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. Ct. 249.
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admitted in effect even by opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts.
But is this the limit of its power? The foregoing historical sketch
does not support an affirmative answer to this question, nor do general
principles. The elbow-room accorded Congress by the "necessary and
proper" clause is admittedly broad, and it is a sound maxim of con-
stitutional interpretation that the Constitution does not grant power
in one place to withdraw it in another.19 The majority in the Abrams
case stand on secure ground.
20
There'is another aspect to this subject. For the most part those
who are endeavoring to-day to elaborate constitutional restrictions
upon Congress's power over the press have shown themselves in the
past distinctly opposed to the curtailment of legislative discretion by
definite, unbending constitutional limitations. Personally, I am dis-
posed to agree with their earlier rather than their later position. Amid
the uncomplicated conditions of frontier life it was entirely feasible
to assure each individual a certain quantum of "inalienable rights,"
but to-day the pursuit of happiness has become a joint-stock enterprise
in which the welfare of all is embarked. In this situation it is much
more to the point to insist upon the responsibilit' of legislators than
their lack of power. Besides, is there anyone who seriously supposes
that fair discussion of men and measures looking to the realization
of public ends by lawful means is, or is likely to be, in any peril in
this country from government? The real peril is quite a different
one-but that is another story.
To sum up, the following propositions seem to be established with
respect to constitutional freedom of speech and press: first, Congress
is not limited to forbidding words which are of a nature" "to create a
clear and present danger" to national interests, but it may forbid words
which are intended to endanger those interests if in the exercise of a
fair legislative discretion it finds it "necessary and proper" to 
do so ;21
second, the intent of the accused in uttering the alleged forbidden words
may be presumed from the reasonable consequences of such words,
though the presumption is a rebuttable one; third, the court will not
scrutinize on appeal the finidings of juries in this class of cases more
strictly than in other penal cases. In short, the cause of freedom of
speech and press is largely in the custody of legislative majorities and
of juries, which, so far as there is evidence to show, is just where the
framers of the Constitution intended it to be.
See Billings v. United States (1914) 232 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 421;
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co. (1915) 24o U. S. 1, 36 Sup. Ct. 236.
- They continue, moreover, to hold their ground in the subsequent cases of
Pierce v. United Slates (192, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 205, and Schaefer v. United
States (1920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 259.
'
1The party platforms and recent utterances of Attorney General Palmer
make it clear that the good sense of the country is coming to the conclusion
that to ban utterances advocating or threatening violence is all that is required
at present.
